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Abstract— Voting remains an integral component of every democratic electoral process. it is an avenue for citizens to exercise their 
rights in order to elect those who will lead them in various vacant political offices. However, enhancing voters’ trust and confidence in 
electoral processes are significant factors that could encourage the active participation of citizens in elections. Eligible voters tend to 
decline to participate in an election when they have a feeling that their votes may not eventually count. Furthermore, electoral 
processes that lead to the emergence of candidates must be adjudged to be free, fair and credible to a high degree for the result to be 
widely acceptable. Unacceptable election results could lead to protests and total cancelation of the election thereby resulting in loss of 
time and resources invested in it. To ensure that only registered voters cast their votes on election days, measures must be put in place 
to accredit voters on election days effectively. Therefore, this article explores the use of biometric smart cards for voters’ verification 
and identification. With the Nigerian electoral process in view, the existing Nigerian voting procedure was reviewed, lapses were 
identified and solutions based on the use of the biometric smart card were proffered. If adopted, the proposed adoption of biometric 
smart cards for voters’ accreditation will enhance the country’s electoral process thereby ensuring that only registered voters cast 
their votes. The approach presented could also reduce the number of electoral processes and personnel required during election days, 
thus reducing voting time and cost. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Biometric systems have come to stay as a secure way to 
guarantee confidentiality, maintain integrity and ensure the 
availability of an individual’s data and information through 
identification and verification processes. Verification is one 
to one security procedures aimed at affirming if the identity 
of a user belongs to him. In the voting context, it helps to 
affirm that voters that troop out to vote on election day are 
the actual eligible voters that registered before the voting 
day. In contrast, identification is one too many security 
procedures that attempt to assert the identity of an individual 
among many other individuals. In the voting context, voters’ 
verification helps to confirm if voters that presented 
themselves on election day are registered voters among other 
registered voters. These two processes are very germane to 
the credibility of an electoral process and the eventual result 
that arises from the process. A series of consecutive 
activities that result in voting on election day is complex; 
therefore, mechanisms must be put in place to guarantee the 
security, reliability, and auditability of the processes [15].  
The advancement in Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) has led to the introduction of electronic 
voting (e-voting) or internet voting (i-voting) systems 
towards improving or gradually phasing off the archaic 
traditional system of voting. While e-voting entails the 
incorporation of ICT tools in the electoral process, i-voting 
involves the conduct of election over the internet.  
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Regardless of the electoral system adopted, authenticating 
and verifying the identity of voters remains a significant 
component of every credible electoral process. Besides, 
validating voters, time taken by an individual voter to 
complete the voting process need to be reduced to the barest 
minimum. Instances, where voter’s verification or the actual 
voting requires a long period, could disenfranchise some 
voters from participating in the election [38]. With an 
emphasis on the 2019 Nigeria general election, the country’s 
electoral body- Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) revealed that a total of 84 million people applied for 
Permanent Voters Card (PVC). Of these, 86.63% collected 
their PVC, perhaps intending to participate in the election 
holding across 119,973 polling units in the country (INEC, 
2019). This connotes that an average of 607 voters is 
expected to be accredited to vote between 8 am and 2 pm. If 
the validation process is not fast or there are logistic 
challenges, then not all registered voters will be 
accommodated.  
However, not all registered voters will eventually 
participate in the election; an entire electoral process should 
make provision for all registered voters. Every e-voting 
system should be tailored towards providing ease of voting, 
maintaining the integrity of the voting process, facilitating 
the speedy release of election results, decreasing the time 
needed to cast and count the vote, reducing the cost of the 
election process and increase the accuracy of the results [1]. 
The adoption of e-voting systems could increase 
participation of eligible voters in the electoral process as 
well as yielding an improved election outcome [2]. Similarly, 
the introduction of e-voting could significantly lead to the 
massive turn out of young, educated and internet-ready 
proportions of registered voters [30]. This is major because 
its introduction will earn voters’ trust in the credibility of the 
voting process, thereby assuring voters that their votes are 
secured and will eventually count. Examining the 
distribution of registered voters released by Nigeria’s INEC 
revealed that 26.57% of registered voters are largely young 
students, educated and internet ready. This is followed by 
farmers (16.23%), housewives (14.10%), business (12.87%), 
traders (9.01%), civil servants (6%), artisans (5.33%), public 
servants (2.73%) and others (7.17%).  
Therefore, if introducing e-voting could cause a massive 
turn out of the youths, then every serious-minded 
government should be interested in adopting it. E-voting 
systems are not entirely free from attacks. Three sources of 
attacks are from voters with forged identifiers, poll workers 
who have access to storage media, and voting device 
developers [36]. Therefore, every e-voting system must be 
designed to curtail these sources of attacks. With an 
emphasis on effective accreditation of voters to ensure that 
only registered voters cast their votes once, biometrics cum 
smart card technology could be employed as a way out. It 
involves the use of unique human physical, behavioral and 
chemical characteristics in validating the identity of its users. 
These characteristics aptly called biometric traits to include 
iris, fingerprint, retina, palmprint, face, etc. Since no two 
human beings can have the same biometric traits, they have 
been widely employed in validating voters’ identity [5], [14], 
[26], [35]. Smart cards simply credit card-sized plastic cards 
that have an embedded Integrated Circuit (IC) for data 
storage and retrieval. Recently, these two technologies have 
been merged to invent a biometric smart card. This special 
smart card has an IC that could be used for storing data as 
well as a fingerprint sensor for authenticating the identity of 
an individual. This article intends to explore the use of this 
biometric smart card for voters’ authentication and 
verification during elections. 
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS  
To have a better grip on the challenges bedeviling 
electoral processes via e-voting in Nigeria, the principles and 
internationally acceptable world standards were extensively 
studied and solutions were proffered based on the findings 
deduced. 
A. Functional Requirements of an E-Voting System 
Several works of literature have proposed different 
desirable features that any e-voting system should be 
designed to exhibit [2], [24], [33], [36], 37]. These features 
include: 
1) Integrity: this feature maintains the sanctity of a vote 
cast; it ensures that a vote cased must not be altered or 
manipulated in any way. Once the vote is valid, it must be 
upheld as valid and must count as a valid vote. Also, should 
a vote cast be invalid, such vote should never be adjudged to 
be valid.  
2) Authenticity: this feature emphasizes that, before voters 
can cast their votes, they must declare their identity. Having 
met all criteria, the same voter that registered to vote must be 
the same voter that came to vote on the election day. Voting 
cannot be done by proxy; hence;, mechanisms must be put in 
place to guarantee the authenticity of voters participating in 
an election process.  
3) Eligibility: Certain conditions would have been set 
before the election as regards those who can vote and those 
who cannot vote. Therefore, only eligible voters must be 
allowed to vote, and no disenfranchisement should be 
allowed.  
4) Privacy: this stipulates that there should not be any 
form of interference that could alter or influence voters’ 
choice of the candidate while the vote is being cast. Voting 
must be done openly but in secret. After voting, nothing 
should be able to link voters to their votes.  
5) Uniqueness: a voter is expected to cast a single vote for 
a candidate. No voters should be allowed to vote more than 
once for the same candidate. Also, under no circumstance 
should a voter be allowed to re-cast a vote. Voting should be 
a once and for all processes. Therefore, every e-voting 
system should be tailored to guarantee this.  
6) No receipts: it is not a desirable feature for voters to be 
able to prove to a third party whom they vote for. 
Mechanisms must be put in place to guarantee that no third 
party will be able to view the content of a ballot while the 
election is still ongoing. Also, after the election, no one 
should be allowed to trace a vote to a voter. 
7) Mobility: this emphasizes that voters should be able to 
cast their votes anywhere. There should not be a designated 
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location where voters should cast their votes. A location 
bound voting exercise has been proved to lead to voters’ 
disenfranchisement. So, a voting exercise should be simple, 
flexible, and easy enough for any eligible voter to participate. 
The voting exercise should come at a minimal and 
affordable cost to voters. Therefore, voting centers should be 
designated at places closer to voters. For instance, there 
could be dedicated voting centers to students most especially 
private Universities students who may not be allowed to exit 
their campuses to participate in the election.  
8) Uncoercibility: voters must not be forced to vote. Their 
choice on whom to vote for on election day should not be 
influenced in any way.  
9) Fairness: while voting is ongoing, no individual should 
be able to predict or reveal the result of the election until the 
voting process has been completed. Releasing partial results 
of elections could cause a swing in a vote to be cast. Voters 
should have a mind that their candidate will win as no voter 
wants to vote for a candidate that will eventually lose. 
Therefore, in the spirit of fairness, partial results of the 
election should not be released until the whole election 
process is complete.  
10) Completeness: A voting system is acclaimed to be 
complete if all valid votes are counted and count; if no valid 
vote is disqualified and if invalid votes remain invalid.  
11) Usability: The tools that will be used in the election 
process should be simple enough for voters to use. 
Instructions on how to use these tools must have been 
properly spelled out before the election day. This could be 
achieved through voters’ education and orientation before 
the election day.   
12) Verifiability: voters must be able to ascertain that 
their valid votes cast reflected in the result declared. An 
assurance that all valid votes will count will encourage 
eligible citizens to participate in elections. 
13) Fault tolerance: a perfect e-voting system must be 
able to be robust to a great extent. It must not breakdown 
frequently. Should its breakdown, a fail-safe mechanism 
must be in place to guarantee that the breakdown will be 
temporary and the system will eventually be restored. 
Mechanisms must be put in place to guarantee that a 
breakdown of any tool in use will not undermine the 
electoral process.  
14) Multi-user: an e-voting system should be able to 
accommodate any number of eligible voters that are 
interested in participating in an election.  
15) Multi-election: an e-voting system should be a 
guarantee that multiple elections can take place 
simultaneously at different accredited locations.  
B. Nigerian Voting Procedure 
Polling stations on election day are expected to be opened 
for accreditation and voting between 8:00 am to 2.00 pm. 
The voting process can be divided into four main stages: 
• PVC verification 
• Voters fingerprint authentication using SCR 
• Voters’ details confirmation on the voters Register and 
inking of the voters’ cuticle  
• Issuance of the ballot paper and proceeding to the 
voting dock to cast a vote 
Voters, Assistant Presiding Officer III (APO III), 
Assistant Presiding Officer II (APO II), Assistant Presiding 
Officer I (APO I), and the Presiding Officer (PO) are the 
main actors during the voting process. On arriving a polling 
unit, voters are expected to be on a queue for the 
accreditation and voting exercise. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Sequence Diagram for Nigerian Voting Process 
 
Fig. 1 presents a sequence diagram that exhaustively 
illustrates the series of activities that a voter must go through 
in order to cast his vote.   
C. Challenges of Nigerian Voting System  
Nigeria- the most populous country in Africa and seventh 
in the world remains the fastest growing population in the 
world [44]. Her population remains her major source of 
strength and yet reasons for her impending challenges in 
every sector of the economy. With an emphasis on the 
Nigerian electoral process, there have been gradual 
improvements based on the challenges we face each election 
year. Recently, the new turn to our electoral challenges in 
Nigeria is “vote-buying”. It could be as old as democracy 
itself as instances where participants or parties use money or 
material things to influence voters’ decisions have been 
around for a long time [8]. It is an act of presenting material 
gifts or cash to voters in exchange for their votes during 
elections [19]. Vote-buying [21] is defined as: 
“a form of political clientelism which characterizes 
instrumental and reciprocal relationships of mutually 
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beneficial exchange between actors of unequal social, 
economic, and political status.” 
It is illegal and unexpected behavior that should not be 
exhibited among actors (voters, politicians and electoral 
body) in any democratic setting. Despite the adoption of 
secret balloting, vote-buying thrives across nations of the 
world [19]. Another study identified other forms of vote-
buying [31], such as: distributing contingent benefits to 
legislators (legislative vote-buying), providing infrastructure 
projects in regions with opposition members to win their 
political support (non-excludable vote buying) and sharing 
material benefits to individual, groups of people or 
organization without necessarily mandating them to provide 
political support (non-binding vote-buying). Interestingly, all 
these forms of vote-buying have characterized and marred 
the Nigerian electoral process. However, Nigeria is not the 
only African country where vote-buying thrives; a survey 
carried out [39] as shown in Fig. 2 on vote-buying thrives 
across many African countries.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Trends of Vote Buying in African Countries [21]  
 
Besides Africa, cases of vote buying have been reported 
in countries like Jordan [25], Argentina [6], Lebanon [13], 
Mexico [28], Taiwan [48], Philippines [16], [22], [40] and 
Latin America [11]. 
Vote-buying flourishes in countries where the principles 
of secret balloting are not strictly adhered, and party agents 
could monitor how voters cast their votes [23]. Also, the 
level of information voters has about contestants could 
determine if vote-buying will thrive or not. Should voters 
know that an incumbent has not performed to expectation, 
they could demand a higher price in exchange for their votes 
and still refuse to vote for them. However, in instances 
where voters have little information about contestants, they 
could go-ahead to sell their votes at any price. Above it all, 
greater poverty [40], [42] and lack of basic social amenities 
are major factors facilitating the growth of vote-buying. 
Nevertheless, vote-buying may be minimal in urban areas 
compared to rural areas [9]. 
Recently, a new twist to the problems bedeviling our 
voting system is different cases of stolen PVC reported few 
days to the 2019 general election. These stolen PVC could 
be distributed to voters to influence election results in favor 
of a particular aspirant. The e-voting system being practiced 
in Nigeria has not fully mandated biometric authentication as 
a requirement for voting. It laid more emphasis on PVC 
authentication than voters’ biometric authentication via 
fingerprint. According to section 11(b) and (e) of the 
election guideline released by INEC, it says: 
 
“11b) Where a voter’s PVC is read but his/her 
fingerprint is not authenticated, the APO I shall refer the 
voter to the APO II who shall: (i) request the voter to 
thumbprint the appropriate box in the Register of Voters; 
(ii) request the voter to provide his/her phone number in 
the appropriate box in the Register of Voters; (iii) 
continue with the accreditation of the voter, and (iv) 
refer the voter to the PO or APO (VP) for issuance of 
ballot paper(s)” 
 
“11e) Where a voter’s PVC is read and the SCR shows 
the details of another person, rather than the details of 
the cardholder as printed on the PVC, the APO I shall: (i) 
Refer the voter to APO II to confirm that the details of 
the voter in the Register of Voters correspond to those on 
the PVC; (ii) APO II if satisfied that the holder of the 
card is on the Register of Voters, shall record the phone 
number of the voter in the appropriate box on the 
Register of Voters, and (iii) Proceed with the 
accreditation of the voter ” 
 
These loopholes could be explored in rigging the election. 
Unfortunately, some logistic challenges that led to the 
postponement of elections in 2015 general elections still 
surfaced during the 2019 general elections. Cases of 
malfunctioning smart card readers perhaps as a result of 
empty batteries or the failure of the SCR in accrediting 
voters fingerprint; late arrivals of INEC officials as well as 
voting materials, inability of registered voters to find their 
names on the voters’ register, snatching of ballot materials 
are some inadequacies that sprung up even in the 2019 
general elections. Voters’ education remains an integral 
component of any electoral process that could ensure that 
votes eventually cast count. It could significantly reduce the 
number of invalid votes that will be canceled. Before 
elections, voters ought to be oriented about how to vote, the 
right finger to use (the use of thumb was discouraged in 
2019 general elections as the number of parties participating 
in the election was many and the space allotted for thumb 
printing was small), the right ballot paper to use for 
respective candidate.  
Due to the number of political offices available, three 
different political offices were voted for on the first election 
day. However, the ballot paper for each elective post was the 
same though the ballot boxes were different. Hence, many 
voters had to check the ballot paper after thumb printing 
before dropping it inside the ballot boxes. This act violates 
the principle of the secret ballot system in which adequate 
voters’ education would have possibly eliminated. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian voting system is characterized by 
different cases of over-voting on election days. This could 
connote instances where the total number of votes cast at a 
polling unit exceeds the number of registered voters in the 
Polling unit. This could also be seen in cases where the total 
number of votes cast at a Polling unit exceeds the total 
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number of accredited voters [17]. In the Nigerian context, 
over voting always result from the manipulation of PVC, 
SCR, and the Electronic Voters Register (EVR). This will be 
greatly minimized when EVR is completely replaced with 
BSC. 
D. Existing Solutions to Challenges faced by Nigerian E-
voting System 
Several proposals aimed at improving the present 
Nigerian e-voting system have been put forward by various 
researchers. Human control and manipulation of specific 
technological devices are one of the challenges of the 
Nigerian e-voting system [45]. Therefore, an automated 
polling system that minimizes human supervision thereby 
guaranteeing transparency and accuracy of the voting 
process was proposed. For literate voters in internet-enabled 
areas, ATM internet-enabled voting, mobile internet voting 
and internet-enabled polling units were proposed. However, 
for illiterate voters in internet-enabled areas as well as 
remote areas, the standalone electronic voting unit was 
proposed. A framework for the Nigerian e-voting system 
was presented in [32]. PVC was retained for voters’ 
authentication while Direct recording electronic voting 
machines was proposed for balloting.  
Similarly, a biometric framework for e-voting was 
proposed [5]. Voters' authentication and the actual vote 
casting were to be done via voters’ fingerprints. Internet 
availability and constant power supply are critical factors 
that will determine the success of the proposed approach. 
The huge cost of printing ballot papers used during elections 
was identified [3] as a major area of concern to the Nigerian 
electoral system. Therefore, the possibility of casting a vote 
via an android application was proposed. The android 
application uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
feature of the phone to retrieve the voters’ location. A timer 
to keep track of the time frame and system status that could 
be used to activate or deactivate the application.  
However, the usability of the application in remote areas 
was not addressed and the literacy level of the voters 
remains an issue of concern.  Security remains a major issue 
of concern for every e-voting system. Therefore, a secured e-
voting system that uses fingerprint and crypto-watermarking 
was proposed [34]. Voters’ authentication was carried using 
their fingerprints. After successful authentication, access will 
be granted to the e-voting software application. Afterward, 
two-layer security through Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) cryptographic technique and wavelet-based 
watermarking were employed to ensure the integrity and 
confidentiality of the vote cast. In the same vein, a bio-
cryptographic e-voting system was proposed [29]. The 
proposed technique employed voters’ fingerprint for 
authentication and Lifting Wavelet Transform (LWT) based 
Steganographic video algorithm for securing votes cast. 
Firstly, the digital ballot was hashed using the SHA-512/256 
hashing technique; the resultant hashed ballot was then 
embedded in a cover video before transmission. During the 
auditing process of the vote cast, the extracted ballots are 
compared with the hashed ballot in order to ascertain the 
integrity of the votes cast.  
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This study proposed Biometric Smart Card (BSC) as a 
tool that could be used to verify the authenticity of voters 
participating in electoral processes on election day. It could 
be programmed to store voters’ biographic details as well as 
a fingerprint that could be used for their verification on 
election day. 
A. Biometric Smart Cards 
A Biometric Smart Card (BSC) is simply a smart card that 
possesses a biometric sensor (majorly fingerprint sensor for 
now) and can self-authenticate itself. Biometric security 
entails capturing the needed biometric trait, pre-processing 
the captured trait, extracting features from it, template 
generation and finally template matching; all these stages are 
also carried out within the BSC. The data capturing and 
matching stages using a smart card is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
Before the introduction of BSC, two similar concepts have 
been introduced: The Template on Card (ToC) and Matching 
on Card (MoC) approach. 
1) Template on Card Approach: ToC approach offers an 
additional way to authenticate the identity of a user by 
retrieving and storing a specific biometric trait of the user on 
the smart card as in Figure 3 below.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Template-on-Card Approach 
84
Separate biometric sensors are used to retrieve the biometric 
trait while the retrieved traits are then stored on the secure 
element segment of the smart card. This is illustrated in Fig. 
3; such was implemented in the form of extracted iris 
features were saved on the smart card [27]. Another study 
[10] also saved facial features on smart card chip; extracted 
features of sclera and ear were stored on smart card chips 
[43], and another study [46] stored extracted fingerprint 
features on smart cards.  Unlike a BSC where all the 
biometric features acquisition stages are done on the smart 
card, the ToC approach uses a separate biometric sensor to 
retrieve and generate the features template to be stored on 
the smart card. During matching, the features stored on the 
smart card are retrieved and compared to the features 
extracted at the authentication point. 
2) Matching on Card Approach: ToC approach only 
guarantees the security of the biometric template stored on 
the smart card and exposes the matching template to an open 
environment, as in Figure 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4 Matching-on-Card Approach 
 
As a result of this, Matching-on-Card (MoC) approach was 
introduced to ensure the maximum security of the stored 
biometric template as well as the matching template. Unlike, 
ToC approach where the matching is done on a separate 
biometric sensor, matching is done on the smart card in the 
MoC approach. To achieve this, both biometric templates are 
stored on the smart card [12], [20], [47]. However, since a 
separate biometric sensor will initially acquire the biometric 
traits before being stored on the smart card, an intruder could 
retrieve the template. Fig. 4 illustrates the MoC approach. 
B. Structure of a Biometric Smart Card 
Unlike the existing smart card, BSC has some additional 
components such as a biometric sensor, secure element, 
battery, power button, status Light Emitting Diodes (LED), 
sensor controller, a digital display etc. As shown in Fig. 5, a 
BSC could have a flat non-replaceable and non-rechargeable 
battery that can provide 3 to 5 years’ operation life under 
normal usage conditions or a supercapacitor that can absorb 
charge from the card reader to power the smart card’s chip 
as well as the sensor. As a result of this, a power button is 
used to switch the card on or off. A status LED is used to 
show the state of the BSC; when it is booting, the orange 
light is seen which becomes green when it is active.  
When the power button is pressed, the green led turns red. 
The BSC’s buzzer beeps when the card is being used; this is 
used to communicate with the user. The length and number 
of beeps specify the particular operation the BSC is 
presently undergoing. Besides, a BSC has a digital display 
that could display if the BSC is on or off. The activities of 
the major components of the BSC are synchronized by 
different Integrated Circuits (IC) that are available on the 
smart card. Such as RF IC used to control the BSC’s antenna; 
the display driver IC that controls the digital display; 
fingerprint sensor IC that controls the fingerprint sensor. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Structure of a Biometric Smart Card [7]  
C. Features of Nigerian Smart Card Reader (SCR) 
The SCR shown in Fig. 6 is an Emp5500 device that uses 
a highly secure cryptographic technology. It has ultra-low 
power consumption, with a Dual Core Cortex A7 Central 
Processing Unit (CPU), a single-core frequency of 1.2GHz, 
a baseband version MOLY.WR8.W1315.MD.WG.V23 and 
an Android 4.2.2 operating system [33]. In addition to these 
specifications, it has a screen touchpad through which its 
icons can be activated; a speaker for generating voice 
prompts like indicating a successful accreditation; keypads 
as an input device; a card slot for reading the PVC; a 
fingerprint sensor for reading voters fingerprints; a USB port 
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for connecting it to a personal computer for configuration 
purposes and a 4000mAh battery that can last for about 24 
hours when fully charged. The device hibernates when not in 
use to save and lengthen its battery life. Once configured, the 
SCR can only read PVCs issued by INEC. The SCR also has 
a fingerprint sensor with which fingerprints of voters’ can be 
authenticated. The SCR also keeps the statistics of PVCs 
successfully read or rejected on election days. These 
transmitted to a central INEC server via its GSM data 
service. Information transmitted to the server is used by 
INEC to audit results from polling units and other statistical 
analysis that may be needed by the electoral body.   
 
 
Fig. 6: Nigerian Smart Card Reader [33]  
D. Accreditation Procedure with the Smart Card Reader  
When an accreditation officer successfully logs in to the 
SCR, the home page of the SCR with six icons will be 
displayed, as shown in Figure 8. The verification icon is 
used for voters’ verification and fingerprint authentication. 
The query icon is used to check the database for Voters 
Identification Number (VIN) and their accreditation status. 
The communicate icon is used to transfer accreditation 
statistics to INEC’s backend server while the Close-V icon is 
used for closing accreditation at the end of the poll. 
Voters’ accreditation with the SCR on the election day 
can be divided into three steps:   
1) Verification: On the election day, an attempt will be 
made to establish the originality of the PVC when inserted 
into the SCR. When the verification icon on the SCR is 
selected, the page shown in Figure 8 will be displayed. 
Afterward, the first icon at the bottom of the screen will be 
tapped once to display voter’s as shown in Fig. 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 SCR’s Verification Page [18] 
2) Voters’ Identification: this is achieved by comparing 
the voter’s face to the image available on the PVC. 
Afterward, the face of the PVC holder is compared with the 
image displayed on the SCR when the PVC has been 
inserted into it. This is illustrated in Fig. 8:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 SCR showing Voter’s Details 
 
3) Authentication: - a biometric authentication procedure 
using a fingerprint is carried out to affirm the identity of the 
voter further. With the smart card still in the SCR, voters are 
expected to put their fingers on the SCR and the 
authentication icon is clicked. The fingerprint features stored 
on the PVC are then compared with those extracted during 
the accreditation exercise. If the accreditation is successful, a 
green circle with a green mark as shown in Figure 8) is 
displayed else a red circle with an exclamation mark as 
shown in Figure 9) is displayed. Once a PVC has been read 
and accredited by the SCR, the Voter Identification Number 
(VIN) is stored on the SCR and subsequent accreditation on 
that same day will not be allowed by the SCR. Under normal 
circumstances, the accreditation process is expected to take 
an average of 10 to 20 seconds per voter. To prevent 
fraudulent use of the SCR, the device is configured to work 
with PVC’s of assigned polling units except otherwise 
reconfigured by authorized INEC personnel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Failed Authentication Process [18] 
E. How Smart is Nigeria’s Permanent Voters Card 
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In quest to achieve a free, fair and credible election that 
will produce peoples’ preferred candidate during the election; 
PVC, as well as smart card reader, was introduced in 2015 
general election. Its usage greatly reduced the rate of rigging 
that would have occurred and led to the election being 
adjudged by many local and international observers as being 
fair to some extent [4]. It was used to replace the temporary 
voters' card that was given to voters in 2011. It is meant to 
be a means of identifying registered voters and it is expected 
to be valid for at least ten years. The PVC as shown in Fig. 
10 has specialized features such as base substrate; high 
technology watermarked printing features and lamination as 
well as an embedded chip [17].  
 
 
Fig. 10 Nigerian Permanent Voters Card 
 
The embedded chip is expected to store voters’ biometric 
traits, demographic data, and personal voting information. 
The PVC has been programmed in such a way that it can 
only work on election days and the smart card reader could 
read the only PVC issued by INEC. However, several cases 
of PVC theft in large volumes reported before the 2019 
general election has signified attempts by certain group of 
individual to use the stolen PVC to influence the results of 
the 2019 general elections. A few days to the 2019 general 
election, cloned samples of PVC were seen listed for sale on 
a popular Chinese e-commerce website. How the stolen PVC 
could be used to undermine the integrity and credibility of 
the election remains a mystery waiting to be unraveled. 
What makes a card smart is the presence of the 
Integrated Circuits (IC) chip embedded into it. That led to 
the questioning of if the PVC is a smart card is claimed to 
be. Physical examination of the PVC revealed that besides 
the barcodes and different embossed images, it has no IC 
chip embedded into it; therefore, it does not satisfy the 
requirements of being a smart card as documented in 
ISO/IEC 7810 specification. There are several other cards 
according to ISO/IEC 7810 specification which are machine-
readable cards without magnetic stripes that could be used 
for identification purposes. Such cards could also have 
images embossed on them with barcodes to store 
information. This specification perfectly matches the 
features of the current PVC being used by INEC. If these 
observations are to be true then the current PVC is not 
totally safe from being acquired, reprogrammed and used to 
rig elections. To curtail this, the feasibility of adopting a 
smart card reader as a perfect replacement for the current 
PVC is being explored in this article.  
F. Biometric Smart Cards Authentication Framework 
A BSC could be the solution to recent attempts to use 
stolen PVCs to rig elections as reported few days to the 
Nigerian 2019 general elections. Should a BSC be stolen, it 
cannot be used to rig elections as voters’ authentication will 
be done simultaneously as the BSC is being verified. With 
this technique, fingerprint authentication becomes an 
integral component of the electoral process. Also, the use of 
BSC could reduce the time taken to accredit voters and the 
number of electoral processes involved. In the existing 
electoral process shown in Fig. 1, 25 processes must be 
carried out by four electoral officers before the voting 
process will be complete. This can be reduced to 15 
processes with two electoral officers if BSC is employed. A 
BSC can be programmed to handle more information than 
any other store cards. Two polling officers can adequately 
handle the electoral processes as against four used in the 
existing voting procedure. Activities assigned to APO III 
and APO II are those that can be handled by two polling 
officers one the BSC has been programmed to handle them. 
Also, the manual examination of voter’s details in the voters’ 
register after PVC verification and fingerprint authentication 
can be totally eradicated. This marred the results of 2019 
general elections as many voters whose PVC were 
confirmed to be authentic and whose fingerprint 
authentication was successful were not allowed to vote 
because their names were not on the manual voters’ register. 
The BSC can be programmed to be the only authentication 
device to be used on election day. After inserting the BSC 
into the SCR, voters can be asked to place their thumb on 
BSC’s fingerprint sensor for fingerprint authentication. 
Immediately after this, the next icon that will generate the 
voters’ registration details can be clicked to pop up this 
information. The information could include Polling Unit ID 
that will be used to ensure that the voter is voting at the right 
polling unit, voters photograph (although, if the fingerprint 
authentication is successful, there may be no need to check 
voters photograph), voters’ identification number, voters 
PWD status etc. All these electoral processes can be divided 
into stages to be carried out on the SCR by a single polling 
officer. Similarly, the SCR can be programmed to 
automatically generate other information that may be 
required to carry out post-election auditing once the voting 
process for each voter has been terminated. Furthermore, the 
post-election data transmitted to INEC’s central server can 
be used to validate the results announced at the polling units 
and those eventually announced at the central collating 
centers in different states perhaps before announcing the 
results.  
So, as illustrated in the sequence diagram depicted in 
Fig. 11. APO is expected to be the authentication officer in 
charge of SCR’s operations. He is expected to request for 
voters PVC, slots it into the SCR, request voters to place 
their fingers on the BSC’s fingerprint sensor for 
authentication, confirms other required information required 
on the SCR, then paints the cuticle of the voters to indicate a 
successful authentication process. Afterward, the PO is 
expected to stamp, sign and write dates on the back of the 
ballot paper(s) for the respective categories of elections. He 
is also expected to employ roll and flatten method to fold the 
endorsed ballot paper, deliver pre-folded and endorsed ballot 
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paper(s) to the voters, request voters to remove any 
incriminating devices before proceeding to voting cubicle, 
direct the voter to the voting cubicle to thumbprint the ballot 
paper and finally ensures that the voter deposits the marked 
ballot paper into the appropriate ballot box. With these, it is 
believed that the time required to complete a voting process 
will be reduced, the number of voting processes will be 
reduced, the cost of personnel required at polling units will 
also be reduced and a more credible accreditation process 
will be achieved. 
 
 
Fig. 11 Proposed Biometric Smart Card Authentication Procedure 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A free, fair, and credible electoral process must be put in 
place for the outcome of an election to be acceptable. This 
article as discussed extensively the challenges bedeviling 
Nigerian electoral process and the modus operandi of the 
adopted e-voting system. The article identified voters’ 
accreditation process as an essential process that must be 
improved upon for the result of an election to be adjudged 
free, fair and credible. A biometric smart card authentication 
technique for voters’ accreditation has been proposed and 
the modality for its use in the Nigerian context has also been 
provided. If adopted, the BSC authentication technique 
could help ensure that only registered voters can vote on 
election days. Furthermore, the proposed accreditation 
technique could reduce the number of personnel and 
electoral processes required for the accreditation process. 
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